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Abstract.  Are the Neolithic revolution’s effects still impacting incomes 
across the world today?  I find strong support for this proposition using 
new, country-specific estimates of the timing of agricultural transition.  
While support with my data is slightly weaker than with the coarser data 
of Hibbs and Olsson (2004), I provide evidence that the differences are 
due to how technological diffusion is accounted for.  A correction for 
world migrations since 1500 significantly improves the fit.  Transition 
year also helps to explain income in 1500 itself, and an alternative 
measure of pre-modern development, state history, has similar ability to 
predict income in 1500 and 1997. 
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  The transition from reliance upon hunting and gathering to reliance upon 
agriculture was one of the great turning points in human history.  Diamond (1998) 
provides evidence that differences among human societies with respect to the timing of 
the transition to agriculture led to differences in levels of technological development and 
social organization (including development of states) that persisted into the era of 
European expansion beginning in the 15
th century, explaining why many non-European 
societies, especially those outside of Eurasia, could be colonized by European ones.  To 
test the hypothesis that early agricultural development is associated with higher income 
today, Hibbs and Olsson (2004, hereafter HO) assembled data on biogeographic and 
geographic variation and on the estimated dates of transition in eight world macro-
regions, showed that biogeography could predict the dates of transition to agriculture, and 
used the predicted dates of transition to predict 1997 incomes in 112 countries.  They 
found that a remarkable 52% of the variation in 1997 incomes was explained by 
differences in predicted time since transition.  Relatedly, Chanda and Putterman 
(forthcoming, 2005) found that an earlier start on agriculture (as represented by HO’s 
data series) and a longer history of states predicts greater income in 1500 and more rapid 
economic growth between 1960 and 1998. 
 
A limitation of HO’s study is that the same date of transition is assigned to a large 
number of countries assumed to have obtained agriculture from the same source.  For 
example, whereas archeological evidence suggests that agriculture was not established in 
what is now Britain until some 5,000 years later, HO’s estimate for Mesopotamia is used 
by them not only for present-day Jordan and Turkey but also for Britain and Europe as a 
whole.  This raises the question of whether it is the historical practice of agriculture in a 
country or the inheritance of an agro-technological tradition that matters, and if the latter, 
which modes of transmission—for example migration versus diffusion by borrowing—
are relevant, and how should we account for multiple transmission paths? 
 
In this paper, I investigate the empirical relationship between agricultural 
transition timing and recent income, extending the analysis in four directions.  First, I re-
estimate several of HO’s regression equations using a new data set on the timing of 
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transition in individual countries, demonstrating that the explanatory power of the more 
country-specific series for year of agricultural transition is somewhat lower than that of 
HO’s data, and that this is partly but not entirely due to their special treatment of Canada, 
the U.S., Australia and New Zealand, which they call “neo-Europes.”  Second, I combine 
the revised agricultural transition data with a new data set on global migration since 1500  
(a rough marker for the epoch of European expansion) and show that the transition data 
perform better when adjusted to take migration into account.  Third, I repeat HO’s 
exercises substituting for years since transition a measure of the length of experience with 
large scale political structures (statehist1500).  If the development of states is stimulated 
by agriculture and the accompanying sedentarism and population growth, statehist1500 
should act as an alternative measure of agricultural transition and the social and economic 
development it gives rise to, and it should perform similarly in the HO regressions.  In 
fact, I find very similar results for statehist1500 as for transition year, including the fact 
that its predictive power is similarly enhanced by an adjustment for post-1500 migration.  
Along the way, I confirm the high bi-variate correlation between statehist1500 and 
transition year in the cross country data.  Fourth, I check the ability of both HO’s and my 
transition dates, as well as statehist, to predict income not of 1997 but of 1500, which I 
argue is a more direct test of Diamond’s claim.  I find that each of the two transition date 
series obtains a significant coefficient and explains up to 34% of the variance in 
estimated income in 1500, while statehist1500 explains up to 46% of that variance.  This 
appears to be the first statistical test of Diamond’s claim using estimated income to 
represent level of development in 1500. 
 
Overall, the results add to the evidence that differences in the timing of the 
transition to agriculture and accompanying social changes have been important 
determinants of the variation of income among countries today.  They also indicate that 
history’s influence on economic capabilities is not limited to the locations in which 
innovations first took place, because technologies and social capabilities can be 
transferred from one place to another, including by migrations such as the ones that have 
remade the globe since the 15
th century encounter between the “Old” and “New” worlds.  
 
The remainder of the paper consists of four sections, which in turn 1) retest HO’s 
models using country-specific rather than region-specific transition dates, 2) test for the 
effects of migration, 3) explain incomes in 1500, and 4) examine the performance of state 
history as an alternative to transition year.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
1. Income as a function of region- versus country-specific transition year 
 
  Have countries that made the transition to agriculture earlier tended to maintain 
their technological lead and to enjoy higher incomes than other countries even today?  
For this first exploration of that question using distinct estimates of the timing of 
transition for more than 100 countries, I begin by revisiting the approach adopted by HO 
(2004).  
 
HO test the proposition, attributable to Diamond, that different geographic and 
biogeographic conditions in the Early Holocene period, some 12,000+ years ago, gave   4
rise to differences in the timing of transitions to agriculture and animal husbandry, 
occurring in different regions between some 10,000 years ago in Mesopotamia and 4,900 
years ago in sub-Saharan Africa.  Supposing that technological progress has continued to 
build, in each society, upon the foundation set with that transition, and that differences in 
achieved technological level, although offset by population growth in earlier periods, 
gave rise to differences in standards of living following the industrial revolution (see 
Figure 1), they then focus on the baseline test equation 
 
 ln  yn(1997) = α + β(12,000 – tn)                           (1) 
 
where 12,000 is the number of years to the present from a starting date in the era of 
universal hunting and gathering, tn is the year of transition in region n, hence the  
 
 
Early Holocene      Î   Neolithic transition    Î   Industrial revolution   Î  Present day 
10,000 B.C.        8,500 – 2,500 B.C.          ≥ A.D. 1750             A.D. 2000 
Figure 1.  Model time-line, according to Hibbs and Olsson (2004). 
 
 
expression in parentheses is the number of years since the transition.  In augmented 
models, they allow for the possibility that geographic factors have also independently 
affected levels of development, and that the technological differences associated with the 
number of years since the agricultural transition affect levels of development both 
directly and via an affect on the quality of institutions (see Figure 2). 
 
Biogeography 
(number of large-seeded grasses 
and domesticable large mammals)      Quality of 
       i n s t i t u t i o n s  
 
    Y e a r   o f      I n c o m e  
    transition    in  1997 
Geography          
(climate, latitude, and 
orientation of continental 
axes) 
Figure 2.  Causal flows according to Hibbs and Olsson (2004). 
 
  I focus on Table 3 in Hibbs and Olsson (2004), which presents a series of 
regression “experiments” testing the relationships shown in Figure 2.  HO’s years since 
transition measure is estimated for seven macro regions as a function of the number of   5
indigenous large-seeded domesticable grains and the number of indigenous domesticable 
large animals, and is measured in thousands of years before the year 2000 (C.E.).  Their 
geographic indicator is the average of three normalized constituent measures of (a) 
favorability of climate, (b) absolute latitude, and (c) ratio of east-west to north-south 
expanse of the continent to which the country belongs.
1  They measure quality of 
institutions by the average of five normalized constituent measures of (a) quality of 
bureaucracy, (b) rule of law, (c) government corruption, (d) risk of expropriation, and (e) 
risk of government repudiation of contracts, as rated in the International Country Risk 
Guide and used by Knack and Keefer (1995).   
 
  I begin with HO’s second regression, which shows that the log of their geography 
indicator can explain 78% of the variance of the number of years since transition.
2  In 
Table 1, the first column reproduces HO’s result.
3  As mentioned, HO assign their 
measures of biogeography for seven macro regions, and thus their predicted values of 
years since transition (henceforth YST), to 112 countries.  For example, all sub-Saharan 
African countries in their sample share an estimated transition date of 4958 years before 
the present, while all North African, European and Middle Eastern countries share a 
transition date estimate of 9847 B.P.   
 
  Aided by research assistants, I investigated whether estimates of the date of 
agriculture were available on a more country-specific basis.  When we were unable to 
identify any existing compilation of data meeting our needs, we undertook to assemble 
such data from the best sources available.  Like HO, we used today’s countries as 
observational units because our ultimate interest lies in studying possible impacts of early 
agricultural development on recent economic and other outcomes using an international 
sample of country-level observations.  The results are available in Putterman and Trainor 
(2006).  I denote HO’s estimates YST-HO and our country-specific estimates YST-CS.  
Appendix 1 compares the two series for the 112 countries in HO’s and the present study.  
Column 2 of Table 1 shows an estimated regression paralleling Column 1 but using YST-
CS as dependent variable.  The results are quite similar to Column 1, with only a slightly 
smaller positive coefficient on the explanatory variable.  The t-statistic is also smaller, 
although the significance level remains very high.   
 
Leaving discussion of the other columns of Table 1 for later, I turn to columns 1 
and 2 of Table 2, which present a replication of HO’s key test of equation (1), the 
relationship between YST-HO and the log of 1997 per capita income (column 1), and the 
corresponding estimate using YST-CS (column 2).  Again, the results are qualitatively 
very similar, but the coefficient and t-statistic are somewhat smaller using the country-
specific transition years, and a substantially smaller proportion of the variance is 
explained, according to the R-squared.   
                                                 
1 See Hibbs and Olsson (2004) for details.  Diamond (1998) argues that continents extending mainly from 
west to east favor diffusion of agriculture, since there are fewer dramatic changes in climate as one 
traverses them than is the case for continents extending mainly from north to south. 
2 The relationship between biogeography and transition year is tested earlier in the paper and is then used to 
estimate predicted transition years.  The first regression in their Table 3 tests for and finds a strong 
relationship also between biogeography and geography. 
3 In each case, I replicated the result independently, using their data.   6
 
  Tables 3 and 4 contain estimates of HO’s fifth and sixth regressions.
4  Column 1 
of Table 3 replicates their equation explaining some 57% of the variance in 1997 income 
using the geography variable and level and square terms (i.e., a quadratic specification) 
for predicted years since transition.  The transition year variables add 5% to the 
explanatory power of their regression two (that with geography alone), are significant at 
the 1 and 5% levels respectively, and suggest that income is increasing at a decreasing 
rate with the number of years since transition.  Column 2, in which I substitute YST-CS, 
shows a first qualitative departure from HO’s results: while the sign pattern on the level 
and square terms is the same, neither coefficient is in itself statistically significant, and 
the addition to explained variance is only about 3%.   Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, which 
replicate HO’s sixth regression using their data and mine, respectively, produce similar 
results.  In both variants, the new regression shows that adding the quality of institutions 
measure boosts the explanatory power of the regression—by an impressive 23% in HO’s 
version.  When YST-CS and its square are used, however, the coefficients on those 
variables are not statistically significant. 
 
  Finally, in column 1 of Table 5, I show a regression HO use to explore the 
relationship between years since transition and the quality of institutions.  The result 
suggests that 38% of the variation in the latter variable can be explained by differences in 
the former.  Column 2 re-estimates the regression using YST-CS.  As with the other 
estimates, the country-specific series obtains a smaller estimated coefficient and smaller 
t-statistic and based on the adjusted R-squared it is only able to explain 5% of the 
variance in quality of institutions. 
 
2. The role of global migration post-1500 
 
  Why do HO’s transition year estimates have more predictive power in the 
regressions just discussed than do more country-specific values?  One possibility is that 
having transitioned to agriculture at an earlier point in time is associated with higher 
income or faster growth today not because growing grain for thousands of years has 
imparted special powers to the land, but because it is associated with a lengthy 
development of human capabilities that are associated with the growth of civilizations, 
including the development of writing, metallurgy, specialization and trade, use of money 
and accounting, operation of large scale organizations, and the management of states.
5  If 
this is the case, then the fact that an agricultural society existed on one piece of territory 
but not on another thousands of years ago may be an imperfect predictor of the human 
capabilities present today, due to migrations of population and dissemination of ideas and 
practices over time.  China, for example, had one of the world’s earliest agricultures and 
perhaps its longest continuous civilization, but Japan, estimated to have been cultivating 
rice for only half as long, went on to assimilate essentially all of the human capability 
relevant to operating a complex economy and society that China had to offer (as well as a 
                                                 
4 Their fourth regression shows that by itself geography predicts some 52% of the variation in 1997 
income.   
5 See Burkett et al., 1999, Putterman, 2000, Bockstette et al., 2002, Chanda and Putterman, 2004a, 2004b, 
2005.  See also Diamond, 2005.   7
little more, a little earlier, from sources geographically further away).  A similar 
relationship may hold for Mesopotamia (YST-CS = 10,500) and England (YST-CS = 
5,500).  By contrast, Mexico’s Yucatan peninsula, which had a burgeoning agrarian 
civilization at the time that Caesar commanded the Roman legions in Gaul, had returned 
to tropical vegetation by the time the Spaniards arrived in 1517.   
 
Clearly, changes in the geographic incidence of human capabilities can occur for 
many reasons, including migration, exchange of ideas, colonization, and social decline 
(sometimes occasioned by climatic and environmental changes).  What’s remarkable is 
that there is as much persistence of the advantages conferred by differences in early 
agricultural starts as HO’s regressions and our replications with more country-specific 
data suggest.   
 
  Crops and agricultural techniques, other technologies, and groups of human 
beings, have been spreading and migrating since the birth of agriculture—witness the 
spread of agriculture throughout the middle east, north Africa, and Europe from 
Mesopotamia, the gradual movement of the Bantu-speaking peoples and their crops out 
of what is now Cameroon into southern and eastern Africa beginning some four or five 
thousand years ago, the movement of Turkic-speaking peoples from central Asia to 
Anatolia, or the diffusion of Austronesian speakers and their crops throughout the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans.  One of the largest and most rapid episodes of diffusion and migration 
was the one that accompanied the opening of overseas trading routes and colonization by 
western European nations beginning in the 15
th Century.  Influential papers by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) argue that the pattern of European 
colonization gave rise to institutions that determined which countries prospered and 
which stagnated after 1500.  The spread of European languages and legal systems are 
identified as causes or good proxies for the causes of cross-country variation in income 
by Hall and Jones (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).   
 
  HO acknowledge many of the factors just discussed, stating that their approach 
“says nothing about the complex dynamics of technology dispersal from the major 
original homelands of agriculture within (or across) the broad regions” and that “we 
know ex post that the technological leadership of the best endowed local homelands 
eventually eroded because of adverse human environmental impacts” (p. 3718).  
However, they make one crucial “correction” for the role of the colonial era: they assign 
the European/North African/Middle Eastern value for their biogeography variable to the 
U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand “[b]ecause the European food and technology 
package was wholly transferred by colonialists” in these cases.  They admit that the 
“same transfer occurred by varying lesser degrees in some other former colonial nation 
states, but we were unable to calibrate this transfer; it is a source of imprecision in 
estimating the influence of biogeography on current national prosperity.”  In all, HO’s 
assignment of biogeography to countries is subject to two sources of imprecision working 
in two opposite directions: on the one hand, they are “generous” in assigning the same 
biogeography to all of Europe as to Mesopotamia, and in going still further to assign it 
also to the four aforementioned “neo-Europes.”  On the other hand, they extend no such   8
generosity to such countries as Uruguay and Argentina, although those countries and the 
“neo-Europes” have similar fractions of their populations descended from Europeans. 
 
  As a first step in exploring the impact of migration, I re-estimate each of the 
regressions above using the original HO biogeography values for the U.S., Canada, and 
Australia, rather than substituting as they do the European biogeography value (see 
Appendix 1).  A special problem is that New Zealand’s biogeography value is so low as 
to be inconsistent with HO’s equation for predicting transition dates, so I assign it the 
value for Australia, which is the next lowest of the series.  In column 3 of each table, I 
show the regressions with the transition year estimates from these “unadjusted HO 
biogeography values,” noting the substantial declines in t-statistics and R-squares in all 
cases.  Comparing column 1 with column 3 of each table suggests that accounting for the 
movement of technology by migration to the four “neo-Europes” leads to an 
improvement in the fit of HO’s regressions to a degree rather impressive for a mere 4 of 
112 observations.   
 
While one might argue for extending European biogeography not only to the U.S. 
but also to Argentina and Uruguay, why stop there?  Chile’s population’s ancestry is 
about 65% European, 35% Amerindian; Brazilians’ ancestors are about 75% European, 
20% African and 5% Amerindian.  Instead of experimenting with differing cut-off levels 
of the European population share at which to apply HO’s correction, a more rigorous 
approach is to correct for migration in proportion to its importance on a case-by-case 
basis.  This is equivalent, conceptually, to inserting a new variable, “Movement of 
peoples,” between the Year of transition and the Quality of institutions and Income of 
1997 variables in Table 2.   
 
I worked with research assistants to develop a matrix of global migration since 
1500.  Each cell in the matrix indicates the estimated proportion of the ancestors of the 
current permanent residents of 162 countries, identified by row headings, who lived the 
year 1500 in that same or any other one of those countries.  For example, the entries for 
the United States estimate that 17% of current U.S. permanent residents’ ancestors 
resided in what is now Germany, in 1500, that 1% resided in Russia, 1% in China, 1% in 
Senegal, and 3% in some part of what is now the United States, itself.  Proportions of the 
ancestors of African-Americans, Afro-Brazilians, etc., brought to the Western 
Hemisphere as slaves are attributed to territories now comprising Senegal, Cameroon, 
Angola, and so forth, based on slave trade data.
6  Although the choice of 1500 was based 
upon considerations associated with European colonization, the same criteria are applied 
consistently around the world so that, for instance, the migration of Hmong people from 
southern China into what is now Laos is accounted for, as is movement of Crimean 
Tatars from what is now Ukraine into Turkey, movement of Hausa from Nigeria and 
Niger to Ghana, return of former slaves (some of them originally from Senegal, Angola, 
etc.) to Liberia, and so on.
7 
                                                 
6 Eltis et al., eds., 1998. 
7 Of course, some guesswork is unavoidable; for example, some 60% of today’s Mexicans are counted by 
most sources as “mestizo,” and our sources lacked estimates of what proportion of their genes were 
contributed by indigenous and what proportion by European ancestors, so we made an educated guess,   9
 
  In this section, I discuss a simple exercise conducted with the post-1500 migration 
matrix.  Rather than assigning people of the U.S. whose ancestors migrated during the 
past few centuries from, say, Germany, the YST value of what is now the U.S., I assign 
them the value of Germany, doing the same for those of Chinese, Senegalese, Swedish 
and all other ancestries.  This is similar to HO’s procedure of assigning the U.S. and 
Canada the same value as Mesopotamia, but there are some differences.  First, rather than 
fully replace the U.S. value with that of Germany or any other single country, I replace it 
with a weighted average of the values of all of the source countries of the U.S.’s 
population, including the U.S. itself.  Second, I follow the same procedure for all 
countries, so that my method doesn’t suffer from such inconsistencies as assigning the 
U.S. the value for Mesopotamia but assigning Argentina the value derived from ancient 
Inca farming.  It accounts, too, for the African ancestors of many Haitians, the Indian 
ancestors of about half the citizens of Guyana, and so on—attempting, in fact, to cover 
any source country accounting for more than half of one percent of a country’s ancestors.   
My migration-adjusted years since transition varaible is derived by simply multiplying 
the population shares of each source country in a country’s row of the matrix by the years 
since transition value of the source country, and then summing these numbers.
8 
 
  Results for re-estimates of the regression equations in Tables 1 – 5, with the new 
variable substituted for the original, are shown in each table’s fourth column.  It is 
immediately clear that the migration adjusted YST-CS variable achieves a better fit in 
each of the equations than does the unadjusted YST-CS, unadjusted for migration.  In 
particular, the t-statistics for years since transition and its square are larger, as are the R-
squared statistics for the equations, in the column 4 estimates with migration adjusted 
years since transition than in either the column 3 estimates with the “uncorrected” HO 
series or the column 2 estimates with my unadjusted country-specific series. 
 
  Finally, column 5 of each table uses the HO estimates of years since transition 
minus their adjustments for the “neo-Europes”—in other words, the values used in each 
table’s column 3—but makes the same weighted average adjustment for post-1500 
migration as does column 4.  The results show improved predictive power for YST or for 
YST and its square relative to the column 3 estimates in all five tables, and in Tables 2 – 
4, where YST or YST and its square are used to predict 1997 income, the new estimate 
outperforms all others, judging by the R-squared. 
 
In general, HO’s series, whether with their ad hoc correction for the four “neo-
Europes” or with my more thorough correction for migration, perform much better than 
my country-specific series and somewhat better than my country-specific series with 
migration adjustment, in Tables 1 – 5.  Why?  A conjecture in line with the discussion of 
this section is that by ignoring differences in the timing of the agricultural transition 
                                                                                                                                                 
treating the ancestors of Mexico’s mestozos as being 2/3 indigenous.  For more details about the 
construction of the matrix, see Putterman 2006b. 
8 Because we lack data on YST for a few of the matrix’s smaller source countries, the shares of source 
countries providing data sometimes total less than 100%.  In such cases, the available shares are simply re-
weighted proportionately so as to add up to 1.   10
between, for example, England, Sweden and Iraq, or Japan, Korea and China, HO’s 
values reflect both migrations and other kinds of diffusion of technology that my 
migration adjustments miss because their series implicitly accounts for migration and 
cultural diffusion that occurred prior to 1500 C.E..  Because the transition to agriculture 
occurred much later in Sweden and England than in Iraq, much later in Korea and Japan 
than in China, the model with my data predicts that Iraq and China will be the more 
economically advanced countries.  It seems best not to view either set of estimates as the 
last word on the topic.   
 
The clear messages in this set of estimates are that the timing of agricultural 
transitions have had surprisingly strongly persistent effects on current levels of income, 
and that migration and diffusion of technologies (including perhaps social ones) also need 
to be considered in any full accounting. 
 
3. 1500: a more direct test of Diamond  
 
  While HO’s model predicting incomes in 1997 comes close to being a direct test 
of Diamond’s (1998) hypothesis about the impact of early agriculture, Diamond uses 
differences in preconditions for agriculture and its diffusion to explain why Europeans 
colonized the Americas, Australia, Africa, etc. beginning in the 15
th Century, not to 
predict current incomes.  Thus, his predictions are more immediately relevant to 
differences in income around 1500 than to differences today.
9  Diamond’s use of the 
timing of the transition to predict colonization in the late 15
th Century and my use of the 
same variable to predict incomes of about that time are shown schematically in Figure 3.   
 
The difference between predicting income in 1997 and predicting it in 1500 might 
be important, as Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) have warned.  In this section, I re-estimate 
the relevant equations of HO (2004) but replace log of 1997 income with that of 1500 
income.  I use two series on income in 1500 from Chanda and Putterman (forthcoming).  
These are based on income estimates from Madisson (2001) and use either urbanization 
rates from Bairoch (1988) and Aceomoglu et al. (2002) or both those urbanization rates 
and population densities based on the historical population estimates of McEvedy and 
Jones (1978).
10  The relevant dependent variables are labeled Ln(y1500
u) and Ln(y1500
b), 
where the superscript u indicates that only urbanization is used to  predict income and the 
superscript b indicates that both urbanization and population density are used. 
 
                                                 
9 Conceivably, differences in technological development and social systems may not have translated into 
differences in incomes in 1500, thanks to what is sometimes seen as the “Malthusian” nature of pre-modern 
growth (see for example Galor and Weil, 2000).  But while most economists believe that income 
differences were smaller in 1500, such differences most likely existed and favored the more technologically 
advanced countries of the time, including those in Western Europe and China (see Maddison, 2001). 
10 Chanda and Putterman estimate the effects of urbanization and of urbanization and development on 
income in 1500 using 32 country-level observations derived from estimates in Maddison (2001), some of 
which are for regions that include several countries.  Using the coefficients thereby obtained, they predict 
income in 1500 for a larger sample of 74 countries, using the urbanization measure only, and 72 countries, 
using both measures.  Like Chanda and Putterman, we use the predicted values even for the 32 countries 
covered by Maddison’s estimates.   11
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Figure 3.  Causal flows according to Diamond (1998, upper right) and this paper (lower 
right). 
 
  Table 6 shows the estimates of the regressions paralleling those of Table 2, in 
which income is predicted by years since transition, only.  In column 1, Ln(y1500
u) is 
predicted by HO’s series, including their “correction” for the neo-Europes.  The 
explanatory variable has a positive coefficient significant at the 10% level, but only 6% 
of the dependent variable’s variance is accounted for.  In column 2, I use my country-
specific values of years since transition with the same dependent variable, and the 
coefficient becomes significant at the 1% level, with R-squared of 0.15.  Column 3’s 
estimate substitute’s the HO series without modifying the neo-Europe’s, with results 
similar to column 2’s.  Since European migration to the neo-Europes had not yet occurred 
in 1500, this is clearly a preferable specification.  In this case, my post-1500 migration 
adjustment is also uncalled for.   
 
  Columns 4, 5 and 6 repeat the exercises using Ln(y1500
b)as dependent variable.  
The results bear a similar relation to one another as those in columns 1 – 3, but in all 
cases the fit of the explanatory variable is better.  Years since transition can explain about 
33% of the variation of income among the 57 countries for which we have estimates.  
Although the number of countries covered is smaller than that in HO’s exercises, the 
sample is nonetheless quite diverse, coming from every continent.  The results are 
supportive of Diamond’s hypothesis, although 2/3 of income variation remains 
unexplained. 
 
  Table 7 also shows six regressions using the same six combinations of dependent 
variable and transition data series as in Table 6, but the more elaborate specification of 
Table 3.  Unlike in Table 3, the coefficient on geography is never significant here, and 
the level and square terms for YST are often insignificant as well.  However, the 
significance of individual coefficients can be misleading since the three explanatory   12
variables are correlated (see Table 1), and the R-squared statistics indicate some 
improvements in overall predictive power.   
 
  In sum, we are able to confirm a variant of Diamond’s hypothesis at the historical 
cross-roads he focused on, although the fit is curiously less precise.  Some of the 
difference may be attributable to the more imprecise estimates of income in 1500 than in 
1997, but there is an intriguing possibility that it also reflects the fact that differences in 
living standards associated with differences in early development have actually been 




4. Agriculture and the state: an old story that still holds water 
 
  Historians and archeologists have long recognized a connection between the rise 
of agriculture and the rise of states.  When Europeans made their first landings on the 
island of New Guinea during the 16
th through the 19
th Centuries, they found neither a 
government nor a set of states vying for control of the large island.  Anthropologists 
estimate that New Guinea, which during those centuries was populated by about a million 
people, is inhabited by tribes speaking as many as seven hundred different languages, 
none of which had ever formed a kingdom or empire.  Large scale polities were also not 
found in Australia, Brazil, most of what is now the Congo, the southernmost parts of 
South America, and northernmost North America, Europe and Asia.  And in general, it is 
agreed that such polities probably did not exist anywhere in the world before intensive 
cultivation of grains arose first in Mesopotamia, then in China and Egypt, eventually also 
in Mexico and Peru.  In the archeological record, kingdoms and empires appear only after 
achievement of substantial population density over an area of some size, which tends to 
occur only hundreds or even thousands of years after establishment of settled agricultural 
villages.  That the same pattern occurred independently and at different times in 
Mesopotamia, China, Mexico, Peru, and elsewhere, is striking.    
  
 Bockestette  et al. studied a measure of the depth of countries’ histories of supra-
tribal polities and found it to be a strong predictor of economic growth during the period 
1960 – 1995.  They also found it to be correlated with various political and institutional 
measures and with the level of per capita income in 1995.  While the measure’s 
significance in predicting 1995 income levels (as opposed to post 1960 growth rates) is 
not robust to inclusion of some sets of controls, it adds significantly to the predictive 
power of the set of instruments that Hall and Jones use to predict “social infrastructure.”  
Chanda and Putterman (2005) extend this work, studying both statehist05, which indexes 
the extent of indigenous state control over a present-day country’s territory between 1 
and 1950 C.E., and with statehist1500, which covers only the period 1 to 1500 C.E.  
(Both variables reduce the weight on past years using a discount rate of 5% per 50 years 
                                                 
11 As mentioned in footnote 8, income differences were lower in 1500, perhaps due to the “Malthusian” 
nature of agrarian growth.  If the head start some regions gained from early agrarian development translated 
into a head start on industrialization as well, as casual empiricism suggests, and if industrialization initially 
magnifies income differences, then larger gradients of income with respect to YST would be expected in 
1997 than in 1500.    13
before the present.)  They find, among other things, that statehist1500 is a good predictor 
of average income in countries as of 1500, and that it is highly correlated with HO’s year 
of agricultural transition measure (for a global sample of 90 countries, the correlation is 
0.73).
12   
 
  In this section, I report the correlation between statehist1500 and our country-
specific years since transition variable, then discuss estimates of regressions paralleling 
those in Tables 2, 3, 6 and 7 but substituting statehist1500 for years since transition.  I 
also conduct a parallel exercise using the post-1500 migration matrix with statehist1500 
in place of YST.  
 
  The bi-variate correlation between statehist1500 and our country-specific years 
since transition variable, in the sample of 149 countries for which both are available, is 
0.634, significant with p = < .001.   Table 8 provides estimates paralleling those of Tables 
2 and 6, while Table 9 does the same for Tables 3 and 7.  Because statehist1500 takes a 
unique value for each country, like YST-CS, the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 
can be compared to those in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.  Like the coefficients on YST-
CS, those on statehist1500 are both significant at the 0.1% level.  As with YST-CS, the 
migration adjustment considerably improves the ability to predict 1997 income (see 
Column 2).  The percentage of the variance in 1997 income explained by statehist1500 
plus the migration adjustment is an impressive 34%.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 can be 
compared to columns 2 and 4 of Table 6.  Again the coefficients on statehist1500 like 
those on YST-CS are significant at the 0.1% level, and the percentage of variance in 1500 
C.E. income explained is even higher when using statehist1500, reaching 46% in column 
4.  Post-1500 migration adjustments are omitted when prediction 1500 income, since they 
have no bearing on the dependent variable in that case. 
 
  Table 9 bears the same relationship to Tables 3 and 7 as Table 8 does to Tables 2 
and 6.  Results for statehist1500 and its square resemble those for YST-CS and its square, 
but the percentage of the variance of 1500 C.E. income that is explained using 
statehist1500 is noticeably larger.   
 
  The results of these exercises suggest that statehist1500 has at least as much 
power to predict recent incomes as does YST, and that taking account of migration 
improves the fit for statehist1500 as it does for the transition measure.  The slightly better 
performance of statehist1500 in some regressions may be explained by the fact that 
unlike YST, statehist1500 takes into account developments long after the initial 
appearance of agriculture.
13  In this respect, statehist’s superiority resembles that of YST-
                                                 
12 For this correlation, see Chanda and Putterman (2004a).  Statehist has also been tested and found to be a 
powerful instrument in studies by Aghion and Howitt (2005) and Bardhan (2005), among others.  The 
statehist data and a description of how they are calculated are available at 
www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis%5FPutterman 
13 A closer analogue to YST than statehist would be one that estimates the time elapsed since the first state 
appeared on a territory.  That information is unavailable in the statehist data set, which estimates state 
presence back to 1 C.E. only.  Statehist measures the accumulated experience with states during the years 
since that time.   14
HO, which reflects diffusion of agriculture in contrast to YST-CS, which only considers 




  The exercises presented here reconfirm Hibbs and Olsson’s finding of a 
remarkable amount of persistence of the effects of early Neolithic transitions on levels of 
economic development in recent times.  Rather than improving upon the performance of 
HO’s less country-specific measures of years since transition, however, my country-
specific YST series is less successful at predicting recent income.  My exercises using 
post-1500 migration data support the conjecture that the difference is due to the fact that 
development is related not so much to when agriculture began on a country’s territory as 
such as to how old a tradition of agricultural and other technologies and social capacities 
the country has inherited through channels of diffusion that include but are probably not 
limited to migration. 
 
  Estimated income differences in 1500 can also be predicted by YST, as Diamond 
(1998) implies.  But the predictive power is somewhat lower, perhaps partly due to less 
accurate income numbers, but partly to the smaller sample size and the fact that income 
gaps widened after 1500. 
 
  An alternative measure of an early start in technological and economic 
development, statehist, generates results similar to YST, and statehist’s prediction of 
1997 income is likewise improved by a post-1500 migration adjustment.  Like HO’s YST 
series, statehist reflects development since the initial agricultural transitions, and this 
helps it to perform better than the “more accurate” YST-CS series in several regressions. 
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p < 0.001 
3.593 
(0.409) 
p < 0.001 
4.233 
(0.443) 
p < 0.001 
3.132 
(0.419) 
p < 0.001 
4.240 
(0.262) 
p < 0.001 
Constant -10.757 
(0.911) 
p < 0.001 
-9.516 
(1.588) 
p < 0.001 
-9.237 
(1.719) 
p < 0.001 
-7.079 
(1.626 
p < 0.001 
-8.587 
(1.018) 
p < 0.001 
#  Obs.  112 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.79 0.41 0.45 0.34 0.70 
Table 1.  Variants of Hibbs-Olsson regression 2. 
† Series constructed by taking years-since-transition values without “neo-Europes” 
adjustment, as in Column 3, then adjusting for post-1500 migration as in Column 4. 
 






















p < 0.001 
    
YST-CS   0.171 
(0.045) 
p < 0.001 




   0.192 
(0.039) 





    0.250 
(0.044) 






     0.430 
(0.034) 
p < 0.001 
Constant 5.131 
(0.271) 
p < 0.001 
7.223 
(0.222) 
p < 0.001 
6.603 
(0.292) 
p < 0.001 
6.715 
(0.239) 
p < 0.001 
4.624 
(0.272) 
p < 0.001 
#  Obs.  112 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.52 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.60 
Table 2.  Variants of Hibbs-Olsson regression 3. 
† Series constructed by taking years-since-transition values without “neo-Europes” 
adjustment, as in Column 3, then adjusting for post-1500 migration as in Column 4.   18
 






















p = 0.001 
2.434 
(0.235) 
p < 0.001 
1.946 
(0.372) 
p < 0.001 
1.829 
(0.222) 
p < 0.001 
1.123 
(0.338) 
p = 0.001 
YST-HO 1.797 
(0.627) 
p = 0.005 




p = 0.011 
    
YST-CS   0.031 
(0.118) 
p = 0.792 
   
(YST-CS)
2   -0.014 
(0.011) 
p = 0.212 




   -0.131 
(0.084) 
p = 0.122 
  
(YST  "  " )
2     0.010 
(0.009) 





    0.407 
(0.136) 
p = 0.003 
 
(YST "  "  )
2      -0.033 
(0.012) 





     1.639 
(0.547) 
p = 0.003 
(YST "  " )
2       -0.095 
(0.039) 
p = 0.016 
Constant -3.912 
(0.2574) 
p = 0.131 
-1.231 
(0.837) 
p = 0.144 
0.825 
(1.347) 
p = 0.541 
-0.133 
(0.778) 
p = 0.864 
-2.961 
(2.456) 
p = 0.231 
# Obs.  112  112  112  112  112 
R-squared 0.58  0.56  0.54  0.56  0.64 
Table 3.  Variants of Hibbs-Olsson regression 5. 
† Series constructed by taking years-since-transition values without “neo-Europes” 
adjustment, as in Column 3, then adjusting for post-1500 migration as in Column 4.   19
 






















p = 0.059 
0.953 
(0.253) 
p < 0.001 
0.703 
(0.314) 
p = 0.027 
0.602 
(0.210) 
p = 0.005 
0.318 
(0.244) 
p = 0.196 
YST-HO 2.488 
(0.435) 
p < 0.001 




p < 0.001 
    
YST-CS   0.039 
(0.092) 
p = 0.672 
   
(YST-CS)
2   -0.004 
(0.008) 
p = 0.623 




   -0.014 
(0.065) 
p = 0.833 
  
(YST "  "  )
2     0.004 
(0.007) 





    0.255 
(0.102) 
p = 0.014 
 
(YST "  "  )
2      -0.015 
(0.009) 





     1.875 
(0.377) 
p < 0.001 
(YST "  "  )
2       -0.115 
(0.027) 
p < 0.001 
Inst. Qual.  0.037 
(0.003) 
p < 0.001 
0.035 
(0.004) 
p < 0.001 
0.036 
(0.004) 
p < 0.001 
0.036 
(0.004) 
p < 0.001 
0.034 
(0.003) 
p < 0.001 
Constant -5.129 
(1.772) 
p = 0.005 
2.077 
(0.760) 
p = 0.007 
2.928 
(1.048) 
p = 0.006 
2.634 
(0.647) 
p < 0.001 
-2.488 
(1.691) 
p = 0.144 
# Obs.  112  112  112  112  112 
R-squared 0.80  0.74  0.74  0.76  0.83 
Table 4.  Variants of Hibbs-Olsson regression 6. 
† Series constructed by taking years-since-transition values without “neo-Europes” 
adjustment, as in Column 3, then adjusting for post-1500 migration as in Column 4.   20
 






















p < 0.001 
    
YST-CS   1.883 
(0.802) 
p = 0.021 




   2.336 
0.697 





    2.579 
(0.816) 






     5.651 
(0.733) 
p < 0.001 
Constant 19.726 
(5.267) 
p < 0.001 
53.163 
(3.949) 
p < 0.001 
44.771 
(5.269) 
p < 0.001 
48.441 
(4.473) 
p < 0.001 
17.424 
(5.904) 
p = 0.004 
#  Obs.  112 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.38 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.35 
Table 5.  Variants of Hibbs-Olsson regression 8. 
† Series constructed by taking years-since-transition values without “neo-Europes” 
adjustment, as in Column 3, then adjusting for post-1500 migration as in Column 4. 
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p = 0.066 
   0.042 
(0.015) 
p = 0.005 
  
YST-CS   0.029 
(0.008) 
p = 0.001 
   0.054 
(0.010) 






   0.022 
(0.007) 
p = 0.002 





p < 0.001 
6.191 
(0.043) 
p < 0.001 
6.158 
(0.055) 
p < 0.001 
5.962 
(0.124) 
p < 0.001 
6.048 
(0.050) 




# Obs.  57  65  57  57  65  57 
R-squared 0.06  0.15  0.17  0.13  0.33  0.34 
Table 6.  Predicting 1500 income by years since transition. 
† Series constructed by taking years-since-transition values without “neo-Europes” 
adjustment, as in Column 3, then adjusting for post-1500 migration as in Column 4. 
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p = 0.983 
0.034 
(0.065) 
p = 0.606 
-0.028 
(0.082) 
p = 0.733 
0.055 
(0.135) 
p = 0.686 
0.038 
(0.075) 






p = 0.146 
   -0.223 
(0.424) 





p = 0.138 
   0.016 
(0.028) 
p = 0.557 
  
YST-CS   0.057 
(0.032) 
p = 0.085 
   0.093 
(0.037) 
p = 0.017 
 
(YST-CS)
2   -0.003 
(0.003) 
p = 0.322 
   -0.004 
(0.004) 





   0.002 
(0.015) 
p = 0.917 
   0.001 
(0.017) 
p = 0.05 
(YST "  " )
2     0.002 
(0.002) 
p = 0.179 





p < 0.001 
6.009 
(0.252) 
p < 0.001 
6.269 
(0.304) 
p < 0.001 
6.772 
(1.835) 
p = 0.001 
5.836 
(0.290) 




#  Obs.  57 57 57 57 57 57 
R-squared  0.11 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.36 0.42 
Table 7.  Predicting 1500 income by geography and years since transition. 
† Series constructed by taking years-since-transition values without “neo-Europes” 
adjustment, as in Column 3, then adjusting for post-1500 migration as in Column 4. 
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Statehist1500  1.132 
(0.327) 
p = .001 
 0.239 
(0.047) 













p < 0.001 
6.949 
(0.161) 
p < 0.001 
6.226 
0.025 




# Obs.  105  110  64  64 
R-squared 0.10  0.34  0.30  0.46 
Table 8.  Predicting income of 1997 and 1500 with statehist1500. 
 



























p = 0.764 
-0.010 
(0.065) 
p = 0.876 
Statehist1500  -1.167 
(0.951) 
p = 0.223 
 0.663 
(0.219) 
p = 0.004 
0.937 
(0.245) 
p < 0.001 
(Statehist1500)
2  1.256 
(1.099) 
p = 0.255 
 -0.524 
(0.261) 
p = 0.05 
-0.673 
(0.292) 























p < 0.001 
6.157 
(0.248) 
p < 0.001 
# Obs.  105  110  56  56 
R-squared 0.52  0.58  0.34  0.51 
Table 9.  Predicting income of 1997 and 1500 with geography and 
statehist1500.   24
Appendix 1.  Years since transition according to Hibbs and Olsson and country-specific values. 
  
Country YST-HO  YST-CS  Country  YST-HO  YST-CS 
Argentina 6,151  3,800  Japan  9,263  4,500 
Australia 9,847  400  Jordan  9,847  10,500 
Austria 9,847  6,500  Kenya  4,958  3,500 
Bangladesh 9,263  5,500  KoreaRep  9,263  4,500 
Belgium 9,847  5,500  LaosPDR  9,263  6,000 
Belize 5,882  3,300  Latvia  9,847  3,700 
Benin 4,958  3,100  Lesotho  4,958  1,500 
Bolivia 6,151  4,000  Luxembourg  9,847  5,500 
Botswana 4,958  1,000  Madagascar  4,958  2,000 
Brazil 6,151  3,500  Malawi  4,958  1,800 
Bulgaria 9,847  7,500  Malaysia  9,263  4,500 
BurkinaFaso 4,958  2,900  Mali  4,958  3,000 
Burundi 4,958  3,500  Malta  9,847  7,600 
Cameroon 4,958  3,000  Mauritania  4,958  3,500 
Cape Verde  4,958  538  Mauritius  4,958  362 
Canada 9,847  1,500  Mexico  5,882  4,100 
CAfricanRepublic 4,958  3,000  Mongolia  9,263  5,000 
Chad 4,958  2,700  Morocco  9,847  3,500 
Chile 6,151  4,000  Mozambique  4,958  1,400 
China 9,263  9,000  Namibia  4,958  1,250 
Colombia 6,151  3,400  Nepal 9,263  6,000 
Comoros 4,958  2,000  Netherlands  9,847  6,000 
CongoRep 4,958  3,000  NewZealand  9,847  800 
CostaRica 5,882  2,500  Niger  4,958  4,000 
Cote d'Ivoire  4,958  3,500  Norway  9,847  5,000 
Czech Republic  9,847  6,500 Pakistan  9,847 9,000 
Denmark 9,847  5,500  Panama  5,882  2,400 
DomRepublic 5,882  1,500  PapuaNewGuinea  8,194  4,000 
Ecuador 6,151  4,000  Paraguay  6,151  4,000 
Egypt 9,847  7,200  Peru  6,151  4,300 
ElSalvador 5,882  3,000  Philippines  8,194  5,000 
Equatorial Guinea  4,958  3,000  Poland  9,847  6,000 
Ethiopia 4,958  4,000  Portugal  9,847  6,500 
Finland 9,847  3,500  Romania  9,847  7,500 
France 9,847  7,500  Rwanda  4,958  2,500 
Gambia 4,958  3,000  Senegal  4,958  3,000 
Germany 9,847  6,000  SierraLeone  4,958  3,250 
Georgia 9,847  8,000  Singapore  9,263  4,500 
Ghana 4,958  3,500  SlovakRepublic  9,847  6,500 
Greece 9,847  8,500 SouthAfrica  4,958 1,700 
Guatemala 5,882  3,500  Spain  9,847  7,200 
Guinea 4,958  3,250  SriLanka  9,263  5,000 
GuineaBissau 4,958  3,000  Sudan  4,958  5,000 
Haiti 5,882  1,000  Swaziland  4,958  1,500 
Honduras 5,882  3,000  Sweden  9,847  5,500 
HongKong 9,263  5,000  Switzerland  9,847  5,500 
Hungary 9,847  7,400  Syria 9,847  10,500 
India 9,263  8,500  Taiwan  9,263  5,500 
Indonesia 8,194  4,000  Tanzania  4,958  2,500 
Ireland 9,847  5,000  Thailand  9,263  5,500 
Israel 9,847  10,500  Togo  4,958  3,100 
Italy 9,847  8,000  Tunisia  9,847  4,500 
Jamaica 5,882  1,000  Turkey  9,847  10,000   25
Uganda 4,958  3,500  Uruguay  6,151  3,600 
UK 9,847  5,500  Zambia  4,958  1,800 
USA 9,847  3,500  Zimbabwe  4,958  1,400 
 
Note: Assumes present = 2000 C.E.  HO values computed using equation (3) in Hibbs and Olsson, 2004.  
The value for Europe/Middle East/N. Africa (9,847) is substituted for the original values for Canada, the 
U.S., Australia and New Zealand.  Those original values are 4,958, 4,958 and -3,505 for the first three 
countries.  The biogeography value for New Zealand is too low to generate a YST value using equation (3). 
 
  
 